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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian 
epistemology to Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the 
mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss:
how to suggest solutions to some unsolved problems of Western 
philosophy, 
how to suggest better solutions to certain epistemological 
problems of Western philosophy, and
how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy.
The first section will deal with the definition of knowledge as justified 
true belief as well as the causal no-relevant alternatives approach 
of Goldman after a brief introduction to the contemporary theory of 
knowledge. In this context I shall try to show how to solve the age-old 
problem of knowledge in Western philosophy by using the concepts or the 
techniques of the Nyāya philosophers. Hence I shall focus on the Nyāya 
conception of knowledge and its sources, such as perception, inference and 
testimony. According to our positive thesis, belief, truth and justification 
are not three independent properties. Justification is a property of truth, and 
truth is a property of belief.
The second section will deal with belief-sentences as discussed by 
contemporary Western philosophers. In this section I shall point out that 
1.
2.
3.
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none of the six theories found in contemporary Western philosophy are 
satisfactory. According to my positive thesis, the Nyāya philosophers can 
give an account of belief-sentences without postulating propositions, or 
sentences, or intensional entities as contents of our beliefs. Since, according 
to the Nyāya, belief is a doubt-free cognition, I shall discuss the nature of 
doubt and how the Nyāya concept of doubt is incompatible with certain 
types of scepticism. I shall also point out how to solve Kripke’s puzzle 
about belief from the Nyāya point of view. Moreover, I shall point out that 
the Nyāya theory is comprehensive enough to deal with almost all types of 
belief-sentences of human language generally.
Knowledge
In this section I shall discuss primarily the views of contemporary 
Western philosophers about knowledge and the Nyāya solutions to the 
problems related to the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.1 
Therefore, I shall discuss (A) the contemporary definition of knowledge 
as justified true belief, which has its origin in Plato’s Meno, (B) Gettier’s 
counterexamples to this analysis of knowledge, (C) post-Gettier 
counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge, (D) the causal 
no-relevant alternatives approach of Goldman, (E) some problem cases for 
standard versions of reliabilism, (F) the Nyāya solutions to these problems, 
and (G) the Nyāya conception of knowledge.
A) Contemporary Philosophy:
The English verb `know’ is followed by different constructions that 
signify a wide range of things that are claimed to be objects of knowledge.
S knows that p, where ‘p’ expresses a proposition or a 
judgment.
S knows how to Ø, where `Ø’ stands for activities such as 
swimming, singing, dancing, speaking, driving, etc.
S knows x, where ‘x’ stands for an entity or a thing, or a 
person. Hence the verb `know’ is followed by a noun or 
noun-phrase.
In addition to ‘knows that p’, ‘knows how to Ø’, and ‘knows x’, there are 
other constructions such as ‘knows whether’, `knows why’, etc; that is, the 
verb `know’ takes a wh-nominalisation. Most contemporary philosophers 
have emphasised the ‘knows that’ formulation, but Ryle has emphasised the 
‘knows how’ formulation.2
a.
b.
c.
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Since most contemporary philosophers have focused on the ‘S knows that 
p’ formulation, I shall confine my discussion to propositional knowledge. 
Almost all twentieth-century Western philosophers have accepted the 
suggestion of Plato that knowledge cannot be equated with true belief. In 
the Meno of Plato, it is said that what turns a true belief into knowledge 
(episteme) is an ‘aitias logismos,’ i.e., the working out of an explanation.3 
Hence contemporary philosophers, in general, have defined knowledge as 
justified true belief (JTB), although there is no unanimity with respect to the 
definition of ‘justification’ or ‘belief’. 
A. J. Ayer has suggested the following definition:4
S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) 
S has the right to be sure that P is true.
Similarly, R. Chisholm has proposed the following definition:5
S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S accepts P, and (iii) S has 
adequate evidence for P.
D. M. Armstrong, in his book Knowledge, Belief and Truth, has claimed 
that the following definition would satisfy different formulations:6
S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P or S is certain 
that P , and (iii) S has adequate evidence for P or S has good 
reasons for believing that P. 
B) Gettier’s counterexamples:
But Gettier, in 1963, argued that the analysis of knowledge as 
justified true belief is incorrect. He has put forward the following two 
counterexamples to this analysis of knowledge:7
Both Smith and Jones have applied for a job. Suppose the 
director of the company told Smith that Jones would get the job. 
Smith found ten coins in the pocket of Jones. On the basis of the 
following two premises 
Jones is the person who will get the job, 
Jones has ten coins in his pocket, 
  Smith infers, 
c. The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
 Now suppose Smith got the job and he also had ten coins in his 
pocket. Since Smith has justified true belief in c), the standard 
definition of knowledge applies to c), but he does not know c).
1.
a.
b.
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2. Suppose Smith has always seen Jones driving a Ford, and just now 
Jones gave Smith a ride in a Ford. From these evidences Smith 
believes that Jones owns a Ford. From the premise
Jones owns a Ford, 
 Smith validly infers
b. Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
Now suppose Jones does not own a Ford, and Brown happens to be in 
Barcelona. It is just a lucky guess of Smith that Brown is in Barcelona. 
Hence (b) turns out to be true. Since it has satisfied the other two criteria of 
knowledge, it is a case of justified true belief. But Smith does not know (b). 
Subsequently many other counterexamples were put forward, and they are 
called ‘Gettier-type counterexamples’. These examples have the following 
features8 in common if we take the form ‘S knows that P’:
The truth-condition holds regarding P;
The belief-condition holds regarding P;
The justification or evidence-condition holds regarding P;
Some proposition, Q, is false;
S is justified in believing Q;
S does not know that P. 
The first attempt to avoid the Gettier-type counterexamples was suggested 
by adding a fourth condition, which may be stated thus:
S’s justification for P does not include any false beliefs.9 
C) Post-Gettier counterexamples:
But subsequently other types of counterexamples were put forward 
by philosophers such as Goldman, Lehrer and Feldman.10 In their 
counterexamples the justification does not include any false beliefs. They 
are called ‘post-Gettier counterexamples’. Let us state the following 
counterexamples: 
3. Suppose John is driving through the countryside, and sees 
something which he takes to be barns. These things look like 
barns, and some of them are barns. John believes that they are 
barns, and his belief is also true by virtue of there being barns 
among them. Since all the appropriate conditions for visual 
perception are present, his belief is justified as well.
a.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
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Now suppose people around that countryside area have constructed 
several barn facades which cannot be easily distinguished from real barns. 
Since John cannot distinguish real barns from barn facades, he cannot claim 
to know that what he has seen are barns, although he has justified true belief.
4. Suppose a ball looks red to you and on this basis you judge it to 
be red, and it is really red. But the ball is illuminated by red lights, 
and you do not know that it is illuminated by red lights. Since it is 
illuminated by red lights, it would look red to you even if it were 
not red. Hence you do not know that the ball is red, although your 
belief has been justified as the appropriate conditions of perception 
are present and your belief is true.11
5. Suppose Smith knows the following proposition:
 P: Jones, who is an extremely reliable person and works in Smith’s 
office, has told Smith that he, Jones, owns a Ford. Suppose Jones 
was in a state of hypnosis when he mentioned this to Smith, and 
he has just won a Ford in a lottery. But the fact that he won a 
Ford remained unknown to both of them. Now Smith deduces the 
following proposition from P.
 Q: Someone, who is extremely reliable and works in his office, 
has told Smith that he owns a Ford. Now Smith deduces the 
proposition R from Q. 
 R: Someone who works in my office owns a Ford. 
 Now it is claimed that Smith has justified true belief in R, as he 
has evidence for R, but does not know that R.12 
Counterexamples of this type have led to a number of defeasibility 
analyses of knowledge. A defeasibility analysis requires that there be no true 
defeaters. Following Klein and Pollock the defeasibility condition may be 
stated in the following way:13
There is not a true proposition t such that if t were added to S’s beliefs 
then S would no longer be justified in believing P. 
By applying the defeasibility condition it is claimed that the above 
examples do not represent cases of knowledge. In our last example, if Smith 
had known the true proposition that Jones had entered a state of hypnosis, 
then he would not have believed that Jones owned a Ford. Hence Smith 
would no longer be justified in believing that someone who works in his 
office owns a Ford. 
But Lehrer and Paxson have put forward the following counterexample to 
the above defeasibility analysis of knowledge:14
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6. ‘Suppose I see a man walk into the library and remove a book 
from the library by concealing it beneath his coat. Since I am 
sure the man is Tom Grabit, whom I have often seen before when 
he attended my classes, I report that I know that Tom Grabit has 
removed the book. However, suppose further that Mrs Grabit, 
the mother of Tom, has averred that on the day in question Tom 
was not in the library, indeed, was thousands of miles away, and 
that Tom’s identical twin brother, John Grabit, was in the library. 
Imagine, moreover, that I am entirely ignorant of the fact that Mrs 
Grabit has said these things. The statement that she has said these 
things would defeat any justification I have for believing that Tom 
Grabit removed the book, according to our present definition of 
defeasibility....
The preceding might seem acceptable until we finish the story by adding 
that Mrs Grabit is a compulsive and pathological liar, that John Grabit is 
a fiction of her demented mind, and that Tom Grabit took the book as I 
believed. Once this is added, it should be apparent that I did know that Tom 
Grabit removed the book.’ 
Since this example involves a true defeater defeater, the above 
formulation of defeasibility analysis cannot handle such cases. In order to 
deal with this type of example Moser15 has suggested a more complex form 
of defeasibility analysis. According to him, S knows that P on the justifying 
evidence e then e must be truth-sustained. In other words, for every true 
proposition t, when t joined with e undermines S’s justification for P on e, 
then there is a true proposition, t’, such that when it is conjoined with e and 
t, it restores the justification of P for S.
Against this formulation it may be said that we can never be sure that we 
know the proposition in question, because it is not always possible to know 
a true proposition which will restore the previous belief. Moreover, this 
type of defeater defeater regress may occur again. It is also claimed that by 
adding a true proposition which will restore the previous belief we may be 
adding new reasons for believing the previous proposition. Hence we may 
not be restoring the old reason.16 
Some philosophers are also sceptical about the fourth condition of 
knowledge, which can handle both the Gettier and the post-Gettier type 
of counterexamples. Pollock17 claims that no proposal of this sort has 
been worked out in the literature. Similarly, Moser claims that there is 
no consensus among philosophers with respect to the fourth condition of 
knowledge. To quote Moser:
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‘The history of the attempted solutions to the Gettier problem is 
complex and open-ended; it has not produced consensus on any 
solution.’18 
It may also be claimed that the proposals put forward to handle the 
Gettier-type of counterexamples are ad hoc. I think this is due to the fact 
that the belief-condition, the truth-condition and the justification-condition 
have been taken separately or in isolation. For this reason, even if all the 
conditions are satisfied we fail to establish that it is a case of justified true 
belief, where justification is a qualifier of truth, and truth is a qualifier of 
belief. Before discussing the above six counterexamples from the Nyāya 
point of view let us mention the reliable process theory of Goldman, which 
claims to solve some of the problems of Gettier-type counterexamples.
D) Reliable Process approach of Goldman:
Goldman19 considers the causal factor of knowledge, but not pseudo-
causal factors. Let us consider his example. Tom wakes up in a foul mood 
one morning and says, ‘Today is going to be a miserable day’. Suppose 
his day was miserable, and hence his belief was true. This type of causal 
justification is not adequate for knowledge. But the same belief will have the 
status of knowledge if it is based on an authority. Suppose Tom gets a phone 
call from his colleague who reports on excellent authority that half of the 
staff will be laid off and Tom is one of them. Hence Tom believes that today 
is going to be a miserable day, and suppose his belief is true, as he will be 
laid off. In this case Tom’s belief will assume the status of knowledge as it is 
based on an authority. But a belief based on feelings or moods can easily go 
wrong. This is due to the fact that these processes are not reliable. Goldman 
claims that if a true belief is based on a reliable causal process, then it will 
have the status of knowledge. For this reason Goldman’s theory is called the 
‘causal reliability approach’, which is different from the ‘reliable-indicator 
approach’ of Armstrong.20 Ramsey, for the first time, introduced the reliable 
process approach. He says, ‘I have always said that a belief was knowledge 
if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, and (iii) obtained by a reliable 
process’.21
Now we have several types of reliable-process approaches. The following 
pairs would give rise to several types of reliable-process theories: (a) global 
reliability and local reliability, (b) actual reliability and counterfactual 
reliability, (c) pure subjunctive reliability and relevant alternatives 
reliability. The last pair is the division of counterfactual reliability. The 
following diagram may represent different types of reliability theories: 
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Reliability approach
Indicator     Process
                Global—local    Actual-counterfactual
                    pure subjunctive                  relevant alternatives
If we combine the members of one pair with the members of another, 
then several other types of reliability approach can be generated. 
The distinction between global and local reliability is drawn in terms 
of the ranges of uses of the process. Global reliability is applicable to 
all uses of the process, but local reliability deals with the reliability of 
process in a particular case. The actual-counterfactual distinction deals 
with the reliability of a process in actual or counterfactual situations. The 
counterfactual approach is divided into pure subjunctive and relevant 
alternatives. The pure subjunctive approach considers the situations in which 
the proposition in question were false.
The relevant alternatives approach of Goldman considers situations 
which are relevant alternatives to the truth of the proposition in question. 
According to this approach, a true belief, say P, fails to acquire the status 
of knowledge if there are relevant alternative situations in which the 
proposition P would be false, but the process would cause the agent to 
believe in P. Hence the process cannot discriminate the truth of P from 
other alternatives. For example, Smith sees Judy crossing the street and 
correctly believes that Judy is crossing the street. If it were Trudy, Judy’s 
twin sister, Smith could mistake her for Judy. If Smith could make this type 
of mistake, he does not know that Judy is crossing the street. The relevant 
alternatives approach considers only those alternatives which are relevant in 
that situation. Hence it considers the situation in which Judy’s twin sister is 
crossing the street. But the pure subjunctive account considers the situations 
in which Judy is not crossing the street or Judy is not there. If, in such 
counterfactual situations, Smith would not believe that Judy is crossing the 
street, then Smith knows that Judy is crossing the street. Since this theory 
allows several types of possibilities, Goldman thinks it is too permissive. 
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For this reason he does not subscribe to the pure subjunctive approach.22
As regards the local and the global reliability approach, Goldman 
thinks that they are not mutually exclusive, and he subscribes to a theory 
which requires both. If a theory requires both, then a true belief assumes 
the status of knowledge, if it results from a generally reliable process 
and not just reliable in a particular case. Moreover, Goldman follows 
the relevant alternatives approach. Hence knowledge of a proposition 
P involves discriminating the truth of P from relevant alternatives that 
are counterfactuals. If the word ‘reliable’ is interpreted in this way, then 
Goldman’s definition of ‘knowledge’ may be expressed as follows: 
S knows that P df. S’s belief in P results from a reliable belief-
forming process.
As regards the nature of reliable belief-forming processes, Goldman 
says:
‘For a belief to count as knowledge, I am arguing, it must be 
caused by a generally reliable process. Exactly how reliable I have 
not said. Nor do I think this can be answered with precision. The 
knowledge concept is vague on this dimension…’23 
In a recent paper, Adam Morton24 proposes a similar thesis from the 
standpoint of an externalist. Hence he supports the conception of knowledge 
as belief that results from a reliable process. As regards the explication or 
definition of ‘reliable process’, he also says, ‘There are hard questions about 
the definition of reliability.’25 
With respect to the question of whether belief-forming processes include 
or involve external factors, Goldman says: ‘One thing we do not want to 
do is invoke factors external to the cogniser’s psychology. The sorts of 
processes we’re discussing are purely internal processes.’26 Now let us see 
whether the reliable relevant alternatives approach of Goldman can solve 
the Gettier or the post-Gettier problem. As regards example (2), Goldman 
claims that Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona, although it is true. This true belief is defeated by the following 
relevant counterfactual alternative: 
Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona. 
In other words, Smith will hold the same belief even if Jones does 
not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona. Hence Smith fails to 
discriminate this counterfactual situation from the actual state of affairs. 
Our example (6) is similar. In this case I fail to discriminate Tom Grabit 
from John Grabit. Hence I cannot discriminate Tom Grabit’s stealing the 
book from the library from John Grabit’s stealing the book from the library. 
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Here John Grabit’s stealing the book is considered as a relevant alternative. 
Goldman also claims that when I come to know that John was a fiction 
of Mrs Grabit’s demented mind, this alternative ceases to be a relevant 
alternative, and I can be credited with knowledge.
In view of doubts about the definition of ‘reliability,’ it seems to me that 
Goldman’s theory is still in the form of a programme. His theory requires 
a comprehensive account of counterfactual situations. He also needs to 
spell out in detail the concept of relevant alternative. Since the relevant 
alternatives vary from one context to another, it is doubtful whether a 
precise definition can be formulated. He has also admitted that he does not 
have a theory of relevance. To quote: “I do not, however, have a detailed 
theory of relevance.”27 
Moreover, his solution to the post-Gettier problem does not seem 
satisfactory. With respect to our example (6), he claims my belief in Tom 
Grabit’s stealing the book ceases to be a case of knowledge as I fail to 
discriminate Tom Grabit’s stealing the book from John Grabit’s stealing the 
book. But when I came to know that John Grabit is a figment of imagination, 
then I am credited with knowledge. Since it is not a genuine alternative, 
the question is whether my initial belief is a case of knowledge. If it is, 
then I had knowledge prior to discrimination, and I do not have knowledge 
when I fail to discriminate, and again I am credited with knowledge when I 
come to know that John is a figment of imagination. It is doubtful whether 
the original justification has been restored or a new justification has been 
smuggled into the original one. Moreover, if an imaginary or non-existent 
entity is introduced in the relevant alternatives, then again I will cease to 
have knowledge if another relevant alternative is constructed. Hence it 
might be difficult to establish the very possibility of knowledge in view of 
relevant alternatives. For this reason Goldman’s theory cannot solve either 
the Gettier or the post-Gettier problem. 
(E) Problem cases for Reliabilism:
In his paper ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’, 
Goldman28 tries to identify the concept of justified belief with the concept of 
belief obtained through the exercise of intellectual virtues (excellences). To 
quote Goldman:
“Beliefs acquired (or retained) through a chain of ‘virtuous’ 
psychological processes qualify as justified; those acquired partly 
by cognitive ‘vices’ are derogated as unjustified.”29 
According to Goldman, virtuous psychological processes include belief 
formation based on sight, hearing, memory and reasoning in certain ways, 
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among others. But vices include belief formation based on guesswork, 
wishful thinking, etc. He explains the virtuous belief forming process 
by reference to their reliability. Hence, again he refers to the concept of 
reliability. In this paper Goldman  mentions some well-known problem 
cases for standard versions of reliabilism. Let us consider the following 
cases:
7. Suppose a Cartesian demon gives people deceptive visual 
experiences which generate false beliefs. These beliefs are vision-
based and the visual processes involved in these beliefs are similar 
to our visual processes. As regards justification, Goldman says: 
 “For most epistemic evaluations, this seems sufficient to induce 
the judgment that the victims’ beliefs are justified. Does our 
account predict this result? Certainly it does.”30
From this remark it follows that the standard versions of reliabilism are 
not adequate to handle such cases. This is due to the fact that they rely on 
internal processes for justification, and justification is not considered as a 
qualifier of truth or true beliefs.
8.  Consider the clairvoyance example, which has been repeatedly 
mentioned by Goldman and Bonjour, among many other 
epistemologists. Suppose a person possesses the power of 
clairvoyance. Suppose he believes that the Prime Minister of 
New Zealand is in Auckland, and it happens to be true. Similarly, 
whenever he believes that the Prime Minister of New Zealand is in 
Christchurch, the Prime Minister happens to be in Christchurch.
Regarding this example, Goldman, in his paper on ‘Reliabilism’, says: 
‘The clairvoyance  example challenges the sufficiency of reliabilism. 
Suppose a cognitive agent possesses a reliable clairvoyance power, but 
has no evidence for or against his possessing such a power. Intuitively, 
his clairvoyantly formed beliefs are unjustified, but reliabilism declares 
them justified.’31 But in his paper on ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific 
Epistemology,’32 Goldman claims that clairvoyantly formed beliefs are 
nonjustified. Hence they are neither justified nor unjustified. 
(F)	 Solutions	from	the	Nyāya	Perspective:
Now I would like to discuss how the Nyāya would handle the Gettier 
and the post-Gettier counterexamples as well as the two problem cases for 
reliabilism. 
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With respect to the first counterexample of Gettier, the Nyāya 
philosophers such as Udayana would claim that the conclusion of this 
inference is false. Therefore, it cannot be a case of knowledge. The belief or 
the cognition of Smith expressed by the sentence ‘The person who will get 
the job has ten coins in his pocket’ can be expressed in the following way:
‘The person who will get the job being identical with Jones has ten 
coins in his pocket.’ 
This is due to the fact that the conclusion is derived from the belief that 
Jones is the person who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his 
pocket. Since Smith got the job and has ten coins in his pockets, the belief 
of Smith is false. Since this sentence can be used to express different beliefs, 
we are not simply concerned with the truth of the sentence, but with the 
belief expressed by this sentence. In this case the belief it expresses is false. 
With respect to the second counterexample of Gettier, it is a case of 
belief, truth and justification, but not a case of justified true belief, where 
justification is a qualifier of true belief. The belief (or cognition) expressed 
by the sentence ‘Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’ is true by 
virtue of the fact that Brown happens to be in Barcelona. Since it is deduced 
from the premise ‘Jones owns a Ford,’ it is in accordance with the rules of 
logic. If ‘justification’ means ‘being derived from premise(s) by applying the 
rules of logic,’ then it has justification. Hence justification comes from the 
fact that it is derived from ‘Jones owns a Ford.’ Since Jones does not own 
a Ford, the truth of the conclusion does not come from the premise ‘Jones 
owns a Ford.’ The truth of the conclusion comes from the fact that Brown 
is in Barcelona but its justification comes from the fact that it is derived 
from ‘Jones owns a Ford.’ Hence justification has nothing to do with its 
truth. Therefore, justification is not a qualifier of its truth. If the truth of the 
conclusion were derived from the truth of ‘Brown is in Barcelona,’ then it 
would have been a case of justified true belief. In other words, if ‘Brown is 
in Barcelona’ were the premise, then the conclusion would have been a case 
of justified true belief. Hence this counterexample of Gettier lacks justified 
true belief, although it is true and has justification. This is analogous to 
the truth of the sentence ‘The man with a red iron mask is in this room.’ 
This sentence cannot be claimed to be true by virtue of having a man in 
this room, an iron mask in this room and a red object in this room. Hence 
from the Nyāya point of view justification is a qualifier of true belief. Here 
justification means some sort of guarantee for its truth.
As regards the post-Gettier counter example (3), the Nyāya claims 
that a physical object is not inferred from its look. Our sense-organs are 
related to the physical object, and the latter is one of the causal conditions 
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of perceptual cognition or belief. Since there are both real barns and barn 
facades, our sense-organs are related to both. If we know the mode (or the 
limitor) under which a barn facade is presented, then we can discriminate a 
real barn from a barn facade. A limitor, according to the Nyāya, is a mode of 
presentation of the object(s) and it uniquely determines the referent(s) of a 
term. In this example, John has cognized both a real barn and a barn facade. 
Since he cannot discriminate a real barn from a barn facade, he has not 
cognized the mode under which a real barn is presented and the mode under 
which a barn facade is presented. Since John believes that these are barns 
while some of them are barn facades, his belief cannot be said to be true. 
Hence it cannot be treated as a counterexample.
As regards (4), the Nyāya would claim that our sense-organs are related 
to both the ball and its red colour as it is red. Moreover, both the objects 
and the relations between objects and sense-organs are causal conditions 
for perceptual cognitions. If the red colour of the ball is presented under the 
mode of redness which is its limitor, then it would be a case of knowledge. 
If a person knows redness that determines red colours only, and not the 
reflection due to red light, then he can discriminate a real red colour from 
the reflection of red colour, which is due to illumination of red lights. 
Hence the Nyāya claims that if the red colour is presented under the mode 
of redness, then the perceiver would be able to discriminate and his/her 
cognition would have the status of knowledge. On the contrary, if he/she 
cannot discriminate, then the truth of the belief that the ball is red lacks 
justification.
As regards example (5), the Nyāya claims that Jones does not satisfy the 
criteria for being an āpta (authority or trustworthy person). A person is an 
āpta iff (a) he/she has a true cognition of what he/she says, (b) he/she selects 
the appropriate expressions to convey his/her true cognition, (c) he/she 
is not lying, and (d) his/her sense-organs that are causal conditions for 
utterance or inscription do not suffer from any defect or weakness.33
In this case, Jones does not know that he has won a car in a lottery. Hence 
he ceases to be an āpta or a trustworthy person. For this reason his utterance 
cannot be considered as a source of valid cognition, although the sentence 
he has uttered is true and the sentence would generate a true cognition in 
the hearer. Since there is no guarantee or justification for the true cognition 
generated by his utterance, it does not have the status of knowledge.
As regards example (6), the Nyāya claims that if Tom Grabit is presented 
to me under the mode of a unique property, then I would be able to identify 
him in every situation. Hence there would be no relevant alternatives 
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which would defeat my knowledge-claim. If Tom Grabit is cognized under 
the mode of a unique property which will distinguish him from all other 
individuals, then there would be guarantee for the truth of the belief that 
Tom Grabit has removed the book from the library. If there is a guarantee 
for the truth of this belief, then there cannot be a true defeater. Hence it rules 
out the possibility of true defeater defeater regress.
As regards example (7) of Goldman, it is neither a case of perception 
nor is it a case of testimony. Obviously, it is not a case of an inferential 
cognition as it is not derived from a mark (hetu). Hence it does not come 
under any sources of valid cognition. It is to be remembered that, according 
to the Nyāya, the object of cognition, the sense-contact with the object 
and the contact with the qualified object of the form a being F are causal 
conditions of a true perceptual cognition. Since these conditions have not 
been satisfied, this example cannot be treated as a case of true perception. 
Again, since the demon wants to deceive us, he fails to satisfy the conditions 
for being an āpta or trustworthy person. Hence it cannot be a case of 
testimony. 
With respect to example (8), it may be said from the Nyāya point of view 
that the reliable clairvoyance power is not a case of perception, including 
the Yogic perception, or inference, or testimony. Hence it is not derivable 
from any valid sources of cognition. The beliefs of the agents who have 
clairvoyant faculty lack justification, although they are true. Hence these 
beliefs do not have the status of knowledge.
From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya theory of sources of 
valid cognition (pramāṇas) can handle both the Gettier and the post-Gettier 
type of counterexamples. Moreover, the Nyāya theory can answer some of 
the questions raised by contemporary philosophers such as Goldman. In 
this context it is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have accepted four 
sources of valid cognition (pramāṇas). It is also to be noted that there is a 
substantial difference of opinion among the schools of Indian philosophy 
as to the sources of valid cognition. For the Cārvaka (a type of materialist) 
philosophers, perception is regarded as the only source of valid cognition. 
The Bauddha and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept both perception and 
inference as sources of valid cognition. The Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja and 
Bhāsarvajña accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony; the Nyāya 
accepts perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. But the 
followers of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā accept presumption in 
addition to the four sources accepted by the Nyāya. The followers of the 
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept 
non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) in addition to the previous five sources 
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of valid cognition. The followers of the Puraṇas accept two more, namely, 
entailment (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya). The followers of the Tantra 
accept gesture and posture (ceṣṭā) in addition to the eight other sources of 
valid cognition. The Jaina philosophers have accepted two more sources 
of valid cognition, namely, the use of a type of counterfactual conditional 
(tarka), and memory (smṛti). 
Since the Nyāya philosophers do not accept presumption as a source of 
valid cognition, it is reduced to an “agreement in absence” type of inference 
(vyatirekī-anumāna). Similarly, non-apprehension is reduced to perception, 
entailment to inference, tradition to verbal testimony, and gesture (or 
posture) to inference. But tarka (the use of a type of counterfactual 
conditional) is not reduced to an inference. It gives rise to an inference and 
thereby becomes auxiliary to an inference. Similarly, memory is not reduced 
to some other source of valid cognition. But the truth of a memory-cognition 
depends upon the truth of a previous apprehension that is derived from 
perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony. Unlike the Bauddha 
philosophers, the Nyāya does not reduce comparison or verbal testimony to 
inference.34 
According to our positive thesis which is based on the intuitions of the 
Nyāya system, knowledge is a justified true belief if justification is taken 
as a qualifier of true belief. Hence justification is not a property of belief 
independent of truth. The word ‘justification,’ in this context, means ‘some 
sort of guarantee for the truth of a belief.’ Since a true belief is a result of 
a process, it is justified in terms of certain features of the process which 
guarantee its truth. In other words, it is justified in terms of certain causal 
conditions which are not identical with the conditions of its truth. 
Moreover, if there is justification for the truth of a belief, then the believer 
can identify or discriminate the fact which corresponds to this belief. The 
process which guarantees the truth of a belief is repeatable and objective. 
It can be used to generate a similar belief in others. Hence if I know that p, 
then you can also know that p. Since the process guarantees the truth of a 
belief, if I know that p, then I cannot be wrong. 
Furthermore, there are different types of knowledge depending on the 
sources such as perceptual, inferential, or verbal. Hence there are different 
types of processes and different types of justification depending on the 
sources. Even if the sources are different, the content of a perceptual, 
inferential, and a verbal cognition may be identical. But the ways our mental 
states are related to the same content are not the same. In order to describe 
the content of a perceptual cognition the Nyāya uses the pairs: 
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anuyogī – pratiyogī (first term – second term)
ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum)
viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier)
viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier).
But in the case of a verbal cognition the Nyāya uses the following pairs: 
viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier)
viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier)
uddeśya – vidheya (subject – predicate).
The explanation of an inference for others involves the pair pakṣa–
sādhya (the locus of inference – probandum) in addition to all the five pairs 
mentioned above.35
G)	 The	Nyāya	on	Knowledge:
The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the conditions or causal 
conditions of cognition, conditions of a true cognition, conditions of a false 
cognition, and conditions which justify the truth of a cognition. The causal 
conditions involved in the process are not exclusively internal. Hence some 
conditions are external. 
The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of 
negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the 
internal sense-organ (manas), the external sense-organs (such as eyes), 
the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive 
causal conditions. In addition to these causal conditions, there are certain 
negative causal conditions. In this context it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya 
philosophers have mentioned the following negative causal conditions of 
perception, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya:
Not being too far (atidūratābhāva);
Not being too close (atisāmīpyābhāva);
Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, 
etc. (indriyanāśābhāva);
Not being inattentive (mano’navasthānābhāva);
Not being too subtle (sūkṣmābhāva);
Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc. 
(vyavadhānābhāva);
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
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Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful 
object (abhibhavābhāva), e.g., during the day, stars are not 
visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun;
Not being mixed up with similar objects 
(samānābhihārābhāva), e.g., rain water cannot be perceived 
in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar 
objects.
But the Nyāya philosophers have not treated all of them as negative 
causal conditions. 
They would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) as negative causal 
conditions.  The remaining four will be considered positive.  Therefore the 
third one will be normal sense-organs instead of absence of loss of sense-
organs.  The fourth one will be attentive instead of not being inattentive, 
and the fifth one having some magnitude (mahatva) instead of not being 
too subtle. The sixth one is to be rejected as negative on the ground that 
the sense-object contact is a positive causal condition. Hence the Nyāya 
philosophers would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) in the above list as 
negative.
In the case of an ordinary perceptual cognition sense-organs are spe-
cial instrumental causes (karaṇas), and the sense-object contact is the 
operation (vyāpāra). The technical terms ‘karaṇa’ and ‘vyāpāra’ may 
be defined in the following way: 
(i)  x is a vyāpāra (operation) of the effect E iff (Ey) (y is a cause of E 
and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y). 
(ii)  x is a karaṇa (special instrumental cause) of the effect E iff x 
is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an 
operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation 
only.36
Let us consider the following example of the Nyāya philosophers: 
The floor has a pot. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special 
instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the 
floor is the operation. Since our sense-organ is related to the floor, it is also 
related to the pot which is on the floor. Since the cognition that the floor has 
a pot is due to a sense-organ, it is considered as perceptual. In this case the 
objects of cognition such as the floor, the pot and the relation of conjunction 
are related to the cognition. Hence the cognition is also related to all these 
items. The cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence 
in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone we 
cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When 
g.
h.
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a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified 
object. In the above example, our visual sense-organ is not only related to 
the floor, but also to the floor that is qualified by a pot on it. 
Hence the cognition generated by this process will be related to the 
qualified object or the fact. The relation of the cognition to the fact is 
called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayatā,’ which is a relational property of the object of 
cognition. The cognition is characterized by the converse of this relational 
property, which is called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayitā’. Thus a true perceptual cognition 
presupposes certain additional conditions. 
A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (doṣa) or an 
inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya). A defect (doṣa) is the 
negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition, but 
an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya) is the weakness of a 
positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition such as a defective 
visual sense-organ or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true 
cognition such as blindness or loss of a visual sense-organ. So a visual 
perception could be false due to distance (dūratva), which is the negatum of 
a negative causal condition of a true cognition. Similarly, it could be false 
due to weakness of the visual sense-organ or due to the absence of the visual 
sense-organ.
In our above example, if the cognition is true, then it is related to the 
floor, the pot, the relation of conjunction, and the qualified object, i.e., the 
floor qualified by a pot on it. 
The causal conditions of this perceptual cognition would include the 
relation of the visual sense-organ to these items. But, in addition to these 
relations of the cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have 
accepted the relation of the cognition to universal floorness and the relation 
of the cognition to universal potness. Now the question is, what is the need 
for these additional relations?
In this context it is to be noted that some contemporary epistemologists 
claim that identification and discrimination are necessary for knowledge. 
On Goldman’s theory, if S knows that p, then S can discriminate the 
truth of p from relevant alternatives. In his system these alternatives are 
counterfactual. But his theory cannot explain why a person, say Smith, is 
able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives, but another 
person, say Jones, is not able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant 
alternatives. The Nyāya can explain this phenomenon in terms of the 
relation of Smith’s cognition to the universal floorness and the universal 
potness which are limitors of a floor and a pot respectively. 
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Since Smith’s sense-organ is related not only to the floor and the pot, but 
also to their limitors, his cognition is related to these limitors as well. Since 
the cognition of limitors can explain our ability to discriminate, there is a 
need for these limitors in epistemic contexts. 
Similarly, in the case of an inference,37 the Nyāya philosophers have 
discussed the causal conditions of an inferential cognition (anumiti), the 
causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which 
justify the truth of an inferential cognition or the ability to discriminate. 
An inference, according to the Nyāya, has three terms, namely, sādhya 
(probandum), pakṣa (locus of inference), and hetu (probans, or reason). 
The term sādhya refers to what is to be inferred. The term pakṣa refers 
to the locus of inference where there is some doubt about the presence of 
sādhya. The term hetu refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is 
inferred in the pakṣa. In this context it is to be noted that an inference for 
others, according to the Nyāya, involves five members, which are related to 
each other by the relation of relevance. Relevance is a relation between the 
contents of expressions or sentences via some questions.38 
Let us consider the following inference for others:
 Thesis (pratijñā): The mountain has a fire.
 Reason (hetu): Because of smoke.
 Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in 
a kitchen, etc.
 Application (upanaya): The mountain has smoke which is 
pervaded by fire.
 Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has a fire.
This inference has the following form: 
 Thesis (pratijñā): a is G.
 Reason (hetu): Because of F.
 Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc.
 Application (upanaya): a has F, which is pervaded by G. 
 Conclusion (nigamana): Hence a is G, or G is present in a, where 
a is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), F is the probans, G is 
the probandum, b is the locus where G is known to be present 
(sapakṣa ).
 An inferential cognition, according to the Nyāya, has certain instrumental 
causal conditions (nimitta-kāraṇas) such as parāmarśa (operation), vyāpti 
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jñāna (cognition of invariable concomitance between the probans and the 
probandum), and pakṣatā (a special relational property of the locus). An 
inferential cognition (anumiti) is usually defined in terms of parāmarśa 
(operation). Parāmarśa (operation) is the cognition of the property of being 
the pervaded which appears as the qualifier of the probans which is present 
in the locus (vyāpti-prakāraka-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). In other words, an 
inferential cognition of the form ‘a is G’ is derivable from the cognition 
of the form ‘a is F which is pervaded by G’, where a is the locus, F is the 
probans, and G is the probandum.The latter is a causal condition of the 
former. But the truth of the inferential cognition does not depend on this 
causal condition. Hence the truth of the cognition a is G does not depend 
on the cognition of a is F which is pervaded by G. The truth depends on the 
fact that the locus which is cognized in the operation is characterized by the 
probandum.
 Now the question is whether a true inferential cognition would assume 
the status of knowledge. In this context it is to be noted that a false operation 
such as ‘the mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire’ might lead to 
the true inferential cognition ‘the mountain has fire.’ Since the occurrence 
of a false cognition can be prevented by a true one, the occurrence of the 
above false operation can be prevented by the true cognition that fog is not 
pervaded by fire. If the occurrence of the operation is prevented, then the 
occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to this operation would 
also be prevented. In other words, if a person knows that fog is not pervaded 
by fire, then he would not use this operation to infer that the mountain has 
fire. For this reason the Nyāya would claim that the above true inferential 
cognition does not have the status of knowledge. In other words, if the 
inferential process which leads to a true cognition contains a false cognition, 
then the true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge.  
The Nyāya philosophers have also discussed our ability to discriminate in 
the case of inferential cognition.  Consider the following inference:
Wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire. 
The mountain has blue smoke. 
Therefore, the mountain has fire. 
In this inference the conclusion follows from the premises, and both the 
conclusion and the premises are true. Now the Nyāya raises the question 
whether the cognition expressed by the sentence ‘wherever there is blue 
smoke, there is fire’ is such that the property of being the pervaded residing 
in blue smoke which is signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is limited 
by blue smokeness or by smokeness only. In other words, the question is 
a.
b.
c.
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whether the property of being the pervaded is presented under the mode 
of blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness) or under the mode of 
smokeness. If it is presented under the mode of blue smokeness, then the 
person, who has inferred the mountain has fire from the above two premises, 
would not be able to infer the same conclusion from the cognition of ‘the 
mountain has black smoke.’ On the contrary, if he/she would have inferred 
‘the mountain has fire’ from ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and 
the mountain has smoke’, then he/she would be able to infer ‘the mountain 
has fire’ from the observation of black smoke as well. This is due to the 
fact that the mode of presentation of the property of being the pervaded 
signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is smokeness, not blue smokeness. 
Since the property of being the pervaded residing in any smoke, blue or 
black, is limited by smokeness, the cognitions expressed by sentences such 
as ‘wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire,’ and ‘wherever there is black 
smoke, there is fire’ would be true. In other words, if the property of being 
the pervaded is cognized under the mode of smokeness, then it reveals an 
ontological property of smoke, blue or black. Hence the cognition of smoke 
as qualified by smokeness, not as qualified by blue smokeness, gives us a 
guarantee for making similar inferences. Therefore, a person is able to infer 
fire from any smoke, blue or black, if he/she has cognised the property of 
being the pervaded under the mode of smokeness. Hence the Nyāya not 
only emphasizes our ability to discriminate in the case of inference, but also 
explains this ability in terms of the cognition of certain properties. In this 
case, it is the cognition of the limitor of the property of being the pervaded 
which resides in the probans. 
With respect to a verbal cognition (testimony) also, the Nyāya 
philosophers have discussed its causal conditions, the causal conditions of 
its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify its truth . 
The special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the cognition of the meaning 
of a sentence is the cognition of the words contained in it, and the operation 
of this cognition is the memory-cognition of the referents of the words. 
According to the Nyāya, the cognition of the meaning of a sentence, as 
distinct from the cognition of the meanings of its parts, lies in cognizing 
the relation between the referents of its parts which are sets of expressions. 
Hence the cognition of the meaning of the sentence ‘a flower is red’ lies 
in cognizing the relation of a red colour to a flower. If the sentence is true, 
then it would generate a true cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend 
the relation which holds between a red colour and a flower. If the sentence 
is false, then it would generate a false cognition, and the cogniser would 
apprehend a relation which does not hold between a red colour and a flower, 
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but which holds between some other objects such as between a red colour 
and a table. Now the question is whether a true cognition generated by a true 
sentence has the status of knowledge. On this point the Nyāya claims that it 
would be a case of knowledge if the true sentence is uttered or inscribed by 
an āpta (a trustworthy person). This is due to the fact that a true cognition 
generated by the utterance of an āpta has justification. Therefore, it has the 
status of knowledge.
 From our above discussion it follows that knowledge is justified true 
cognition or belief, provided justification is a qualifier of true cognition or 
belief. A true cognition is justified by certain perceptual causal conditions, 
or by certain inferential causal conditions, or by certain verbal causal 
conditions. Hence the Nyāya technique for justifying a true cognition may 
be used for interpreting or explicating the meaning of the word ‘knowledge.’ 
 From the above discussion it also follows that the Nyāya philosophers 
have treated justification as a qualifier of true belief, and have emphasized 
the sources of valid cognition, which will explain why certain true beliefs 
have justification. Moreover, the Nyāya explains the ability to discriminate 
an object or a set of objects in terms of the cognition of limitor(s). This 
explanation allows us to solve some problems of contemporary Western 
philosophy.
Belief and Doubt
In this section I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of belief as well as 
doubt.  Since there is no proposition as distinct from a sentence, beliefs are 
considered true or false.  Moreover since the Nyāya philosophers could also 
accept the definition of knowledge as justified true belief, I’d like to focus 
on the Nyāya concept of belief.  Moreover, the Nyāya discussion of belief 
suggests solutions to some problems of belief in the Western philosophy.  
Since belief, according to the Nyāya, is a doubt-free cognition, I shall 
explain the Nyāya concept of doubt as well.  
The importance of belief has been emphasized very widely in Western 
philosophy in which it is considered as the central problem. To quote 
Russell:
Belief…is the central problem in the analysis of mind. Believing 
seems the most ‘mental’ thing we do, the thing most remote from 
what is done by mere matter. The whole intellectual life consists 
of beliefs and of the passage from one belief to another by what is 
called ‘reasoning’. Beliefs give knowledge and error; they are the 
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vehicles of truth and falsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge 
and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of 
belief our philosophical outlook largely depends.39
Ramsey also claimed that a belief is “a map of neighbouring space by 
which we steer.”40 So he attributes two characteristics to a belief: it is a map, 
and it is something by which we steer. I would like to claim that the set of 
beliefs of a person represents his/her form of life. It determines the entire 
mental life of a person, including emotions, feelings and attitudes.
There are four views in Western tradition concerning the category to 
which belief belongs: (i) Belief is a faculty of mind; (ii) it is a disposition 
of the believer; (iii) it is a conscious occurrence in the mind of the believer; 
and (iv) it is a mental state of the believer’s mind. Since I would like to 
focus on the nature of belief-sentences, in this paper I do not intend to 
discuss the category to which belief belongs. However, I consider belief as a 
mental state of the believer, dispositional or conscious.
In this section I shall discuss A) contemporary theories of belief; B) the 
Nyāya concept of doubt; and C) the Nyāya explanation of belief-sentences.
A) Contemporary Theories: 
There are six approaches to the problems of belief-sentences in 
contemporary Western philosophy, which I will outline below. 
Suggestions for the sixth approach can be found in Russell’s The 
Problems of Philosophy,41 but this approach has not been developed either 
by Russell or by his followers to solve the problems of belief-sentences. In 
the context of our discussion of the Nyāya view, we shall see how the Nyāya 
view is related to some of the suggestions of Russell, and how the Nyāya 
philosophers can give an account of belief-sentences without postulating 
either propositions or sentences or intensional entities such as concepts or 
images as contents of our beliefs. Moreover, following the Nyāya technique 
we shall explain the difference between different types of belief-sentences. 
Furthermore, we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers would restrict the 
principles of substitutivity and existential generalisation in the context of 
belief-sentences.
a) One of the approaches to belief-sentences may be attributed to early 
Wittgenstein, who writes:
It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’ 
and ‘A says p’ are of the form “p” says p’. (Tractatus 5.542).42
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Since this approach eliminates belief as an entity from our ontology, 
it would not be acceptable to those who would consider belief as a 
new phenomenon which is not reducible to any other fact or entity. In 
this context, the remark of Russell is worth quoting. He says: “I have 
got on here to a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo.”43 Hence 
the view of Wittgenstein is not acceptable to a philosopher who is not 
already committed to his assumptions.
b)  The second approach reduces a belief to a set of behaviour. This 
approach has been followed by pragmatists such as James and Dewey, some 
American realists, and other behaviourists. According to this view, if a 
person believes something, then he behaves in a certain fashion. Either we 
identify a belief with a set of behaviour in the case of strong behaviourism 
or we correlate a belief with a set of behaviour in the case of weak 
behaviourism. With respect to the view of James and Dewey, Russell says:
When I believe a proposition, that means that I act in a certain 
fashion, that my behaviour has certain characteristics, and my 
belief is a true one if the behaviour leads to the desired result and 
is a false one if it does not.44
From this remark of Russell’s, it follows that the meaning of a belief-
sentence is to be identified with the meaning of a sentence about behaviour.
The Rylean approach is not identical with the above type of 
behaviourism, although there is some close affinity between these two 
views. According to Ryle, a belief-sentence, taken literally, has made 
a category mistake. But if it is taken as a dispositional statement, not 
descriptive of something, then it is ultimately reducible to a hypothetical 
statement about our behaviour. Since this view is also committed to many 
dubious assumptions about the nature of mind (or self) or human being, it 
will not be acceptable to those philosophers who are not already committed 
to those assumptions.
c) Another approach to the problems of belief-sentences is to be found 
in Frege, and this approach has been defended by Church. Frege says:
In indirect (oblique) discourse we speak of the sense, e.g., of the 
words of someone else. From this it becomes clear that also in 
indirect discourse words do not have their customary nominata; 
they here name what customarily would be their sense. In order to 
formulate this succinctly we shall say: words in indirect discourse 
are used indirectly, or have indirect nominata. Thus we distinguish 
the customary from the indirect nominatum of a word; and its 
customary sense from its indirect sense.45
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From this remark of Frege, along with his other remarks about belief, it 
follows that in the sentence
(1) John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley,
the proposition expressed by the sentence (or subordinate clause) 
“Shakespeare is the author of Waverley” is the content of his belief 
and it is the nominatum in this context. Now the question is, if the 
customary sense becomes the nominatum, then what would be the 
sense of this customary sense which is the indirect nominatum? Since 
the sense of a sentence is a function of the senses of its terms, in the 
above example the sense of “Shakespeare” would be a part of the 
sense of the sentence “Shakespeare is the author of Waverley,” which 
is the subordinate clause in (1). If the sense of “Shakespeare” is the 
author of Hamlet and if this sense is a part of the proposition which is 
the indirect nominatum, then we require the sense of this sense in an 
indirect context. If we consider a proposition as one indivisible unit, 
then also we can ask about the mode of its presentation, which will be 
the indirect sense of it in an indirect context. Fregean scholars, includ-
ing Dummett, find it difficult to give a straightforward answer to this 
question.46
Secondly, another difficulty, which Carnap47 thinks to be the greatest 
complexity of the Frege-Church method, is that there are infinitely many 
senses of an expression depending on the context of its use. Moreover, this 
type of proposition theory of belief ends up with the postulation of both 
eternally true and false propositions. According to the upholders of this 
view, corresponding to a true proposition such as 2 + 2 = 4, there will be an 
infinite number of false propositions, such as 2+2=5, 2+2=6, etc. For this 
reason many contemporary philosophers such as Tarski48 and Quine do not 
accept an intermediary entity such as proposition in addition to concrete 
things and expressions.
d) According to another approach, the content of a belief is a sentence, 
or belief is a relation between a person and a sentence.49 Let us consider the 
sentence
(2) John believes that the earth is round. 
If a sentence is the content of John’s belief, then (2) is interpreted as 
(3) John believes ‘the earth is round’. 
But if belief is a relation between a person and a sentence, then (2) is 
to be interpreted as
(4) John has the relation B to the sentence “the earth is round.”
On either of these interpretations we cannot derive
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(5) John believes that die Erde ist rund,
or any other sentence which is synonymous with (2).
If we apply this view to a sentence such as (6) John believes in 
Shakespeare, then we have to paraphrase it in such a way that a sentence 
follows the verb “believes”. But if we do not paraphrase it, then either we 
fail to give an account of such sentences, or we have to claim that belief is 
also a relation between a person and a word or the content of belief could 
also be a word, in addition to a sentence.
Since this view is very restrictive in the sense that it rules out the 
possibility of belief in animals, newborn babies and in persons who do not 
speak or understand any sentence, it may be rejected on this ground.
e) According to another view what occurs in a belief context is neither an 
expression nor its sense, but a vivid conception of an object. Kaplan calls it 
“vivid name”. He says:
Our most vivid names can be roughly characterized as those 
elaborate descriptions containing all we believe about a single 
person. Such names will almost certainly contain inaccuracies 
which will prevent them from actually denoting anyone.50
From this remark of Kaplan it follows that a vivid name need not always 
be referential. A referential vivid name for a person, say Ralph, symbolized 
as “R(α , x, Ralph)” fulfils the following conditions according to Kaplan:
(i) α denotes x,
(ii) α is a name of x for Ralph, 
and
(iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid.
By introducing a distinction between a merely vivid name and a 
referentially vivid name, Kaplan explains Quine’s distinction between 
sentences such as 
(7) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy,    
and
(8) There is a person Ortcutt such that Ralph believes him to be a spy.
In (7) merely a vivid name of Ortcutt will occur in the belief of Ralph, 
whereas in (8) a referentially vivid name of Ortcutt will occur. (8) is 
symbolized as
(9)   α [R( α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph B ┌α is a spy┐]
Since the name ‘Ortcutt’ does not occur referentially in (7), it does not 
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imply the existence of Ortcutt. What occurs in the content of a belief is 
neither an expression, nor the sense of an expression, but another type of 
entity. In order to characterize this type of entity Kaplan says:
Many of our beliefs have the form: “The color of her hair is --”, or “The 
song he was singing went --”, where the blanks are filled with images, 
sensory impressions, or what have you, but certainly not words. If we cannot 
even say it with words but have to print it or sing it, we certainly cannot 
believe it with words.51 
Since the postulation of intermediary entities such as images can give a 
better explanation of belief-sentences than the postulation of sentences or 
expressions as contents of belief, Kaplan favours the former approach to 
the problems of belief-sentences. But if belief-sentences can be explained 
without postulating the intermediate entities of Kaplan, then he cannot claim 
that his theory is better than  one which does not postulate intermediate 
entities. In the context of the Nyāya view I shall discuss a theory of this 
type.
f) There is still another approach to the problems of belief-sentences, 
which has been proposed by Russell, but not followed or refined or extended 
by other philosophers. Since the view of Russell has some affinity with that 
of the Nyāya, it will pave our discussion for the latter and hence it is worthy 
of consideration.
Russell, in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” claimed that in a 
belief-sentence there are at least two verbs. Let us consider his example.
(10) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.
Here the verbs “believes” and “loves” have occurred as genuine verbs, 
and the verb in the subordinate clause seems to relate Desdemona to Cassio; 
but in fact it does not do so. He says,
This is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. You 
will notice that wherever one gets to really close quarters with 
the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error 
without assuming the existence of the non-existent.52
Now the question is how to explain the nature of (10) without postulating 
non-existent love as an entity, which will relate Desdemona to Cassio. 
Moreover, Russell claimed that “loves” should be treated as a verb. This 
requirement leads to the rejection of his earlier view proposed in The 
Problems of Philosophy,53 where (10) has been analysed as a four-place 
relation between Othello, Desdemona, loves, and Cassio. Hence (10) is to be 
analysed as
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(11) B (Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio).
Since the verb “loves” in (11) is on a par with the terms “Desdemona” 
and “Cassio,” this analysis does not fulfil one of the above requirements of 
Russell. Mark Sainsbury, one of the recent commentators on Russell, has 
pointed out a few more shortcomings of Russell’s earlier view, as proposed 
in The Problems of Philosophy. He says: 
...the PP (Problems of Philosophy) theory of belief is defective in 
that it makes all belief relational and all occurrences of names in 
the believed-sentence transparent. A further difficulty is that it is 
hard to see how the theory is to be extended to cases in which the 
believed-sentence is non-atomic.54
As an explanation of what Sainsbury means by `relational belief’ he 
makes the following comment:
Let us say that a sentence built on the following lines attributes a 
relational belief: “A believes, concerning ..., that it is -----” (where 
the pronoun picks up the reference of what fills the dots). The 
place occupied by the dots is referentially transparent: “A believes, 
concerning t, that it is F,” together with ‘t = s’, entails “A believes, 
concerning s, that it is F.”55
From the above remarks of Sainsbury it follows that Russell’s account of 
belief-sentences in The Problems of Philosophy cannot draw the distinction 
between de re and de dicto belief-sentences; it makes all names transparent; 
and it is difficult to apply to non-atomic belief-sentences. In spite of these 
shortcomings, I think, Russell’s great contribution lies in the view that what 
occurs in a belief-sentence is not a proposition, but the constituents of a 
proposition, and in his suggestions that a satisfactory theory of belief should 
not postulate non-existent objects and should not reduce the verb in the 
subordinate clause to a term. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya 
we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the shortcomings 
of Russell’s theory and at the same time followed the suggestions of a 
satisfactory theory of belief.
B)	The	Nyāya	Concept	of	Doubt:
Since the Nyāya claims that belief is a doubt-free cognition, I would like 
to discuss the Nyāya conception of dubious cognition. Moreover, the Nyāya 
analysis or conception of doubt may also solve some problems of Western 
philosophy or add a new dimension to Western philosophy, as the Nyāya 
claims that a dubious cognition rests on certainty.
Jay Shaw

Doubt, according to the Nyāya, is a type of invalid (false) cognition. 
A dubious cognition can be expressed by the form ‘Is x F or G?’, where x 
is the property-possessor, F and G are mutually incompatible properties. 
Since F and G are mutually incompatible, one of them may be the absence 
of the other. Hence it may be stated as ‘Is x F or not F’. As regards the 
number of alternatives in a dubious cognition, such as “Is it a stump or 
a human being?”, there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya 
philosophers. But all of them have accepted the thesis that there are at 
least two mutually incompatible alternatives in a dubious cognition. It is to 
be noted that a dubious cognition cannot be identified with a question. A 
question presupposes the cognition of one of the alternatives. For example, 
the question “Is it a stump?” presupposes the cognition of stump only. But 
a dubious cognition presupposes the cognition of both the alternatives. 
Moreover, in a question there is desire to know; but not  a state of doubt, 
although there may be desire to know afterwards.
From the Nyāya conception of doubt it also follows that there is certainty 
about the property-possessor in a dubious mental state. Hence the dubious 
cognition of the form “Is x F or G” presupposes certainty with respect to 
x. Therefore, we do not doubt the existence of x. The property-possessor 
may be an object of doubt in another mental state, where it is one of the 
alternatives. Hence a doubt presupposes certainty or rests on something 
which is free from doubt. 
When I doubt the colour of the table in the mental state “Is the table 
brown or red?”, I do not doubt the existence of the table. Again, when I 
doubt the existence of the table, I presuppose something else. For example, 
consider a mental state of doubt “Is there a table or a bed in this room?” 
In this case, I presuppose the existence of the room. Hence there cannot 
be universal doubt, even if there is doubt about any specific thing or set 
of specific things. Moreover, there is no dubious mental state without 
presupposing something certain. Hence the Nyāya concept of doubt rules 
out universal scepticism. We may doubt almost anything, but not everything, 
and every dubious state has some element of certainty. 
The Nyāya has classified doubts into four types depending upon the 
causal conditions of their origins. One of them is due to the observation of 
some common property or properties of the referents of ‘F’ and ‘G’, and the 
non-observation of any specific or unique property of the referents of ‘F’ 
and ‘G’. Consider again, for example, “Is it a stump or a human being?” The 
observation of common properties, such as identical or similar heights and 
widths, will give rise to the memory-cognitions of the alternatives that are 
causal conditions of a dubious cognition.
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The second type of dubious cognition is due to the observation of an 
uncommon property. An uncommon property is something which is known 
to be not present in the known alternatives. For example, “Is sound eternal 
or non-eternal?” In this case, soundness is known to be not present in both 
eternal objects such as the soul and in non-eternal objects such as a pot. If 
this type of doubt is expressed in the form “Is x F or G?,” then one of the 
causal conditions of this type of doubt is that x-ness or the property of being 
x is not known to be present in the known examples of F or G. 
The third type of dubious cognition is due to the understanding of the 
meanings of the words which have occurred in contradictory or contrary 
sentences. This type of doubt will arise in those who are not committed to 
one of the alternatives or who do not have certain cognition of one of the 
alternatives. Consider now, for example, the dubious state “Is mind physical 
or spiritual?” or “Is soul eternal or non-eternal?” The Vedāntins claim that 
the soul is eternal, but the Buddhists claim it to be non-eternal. If a person 
is not committed to one these views, or convinced by the arguments of 
the Vedāntins or the Buddhists, then he/she will doubt whether the soul is 
eternal.
The fourth type of doubt is due to doubt about the truth of a cognition, 
as in the doubt “Is the cognition of a chair in this room true or false?” This 
doubt implies doubt about the presence of a chair in this room. In other 
words, doubt about the truth of a cognition would give rise to doubt about 
the content of this cognition. Hence a higher type of doubt would imply a 
lower type of doubt if these doubts are arranged in an hierarchical order. 
Here too the Nyāya discussion of doubt can also be integrated with the 
mainstream of Western philosophy and answer some of its questions about 
doubt.
C)	The	Nyāya	on	Belief-Sentences:
Now I would like to discuss the Nyāya view which, unlike Russell, does 
not reduce all belief-sentences to relational belief-sentences, which does not 
postulate some intermediary entities such as propositions or non-existent 
entities in the case of false beliefs. Moreover, the Nyāya view does not 
reduce a verb to a term, or treat all names as transparent. Let us begin with 
the Nyāya analysis of the sentence:
(i) John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley.
In this sentence, according to the Nyāya, we are not talking about 
Shakespeare or the author of Waverley, but about the belief of John, which 
is a mental state of John, and which is related to the self by the relation of 
inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. Before discussing the nature of this 
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belief let us discuss its content, which consists of what Russell called “the 
constituents of a proposition,” which are things or objects in the world. In 
the content of this belief there are three major elements, viz., Shakespeare, 
the author of Waverley, and the relation of identity which has not been 
mentioned by the word “identity.” In the content of this belief, Shakespeare 
is the qualificand, the author of Waverley is the qualifier, and the relation of 
identity is the qualification relation. Since these elements are the contents 
(or objects) of this belief, they have the property of being the content 
(viṣayatā).56 In other words, the property of being the content is the relation 
of a belief mental state to a content (or object). Relational properties such as 
viṣayatās are introduced by the Nyāya philosophers for, amongst many other 
things, semantical analyses of sentences and for drawing the distinction 
between the cognitions generated by sentences such as “Brutus killed 
Caesar” and “Caesar was killed by Brutus.” 
As to the ontological status of these relational properties, there is 
some difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers. Some Nyāya 
philosophers such as Raghunātha have assigned them a separate category 
such that they are not reducible to any other type of entities or identifiable 
with anything else, while others have tried to identify them with the first 
terms (anuyogī’s) of relations. But in the case of the properties of being the 
content (viṣayatās), it seems to me that these relational properties have been 
introduced simply to emphasize the role of the elements of the content of 
a belief or cognition. With reference to our above example, when we say 
“Shakespeare has the property of being the content,” what we mean is that 
Shakespeare has the role of the qualificand in the content of this belief. 
Similarly, the author of Waverley has the role of qualifier, and the relation 
of identity has the role of qualification relation in the content of this belief. 
There are also other elements in its content. Since both “Shakespeare” and 
“the author of Waverley” have occurred in (i), both Shakespeare and the 
author of Waverley, according to the Nyāya, must be presented under some 
mode of presentation. In other words, the property of being the qualificand 
residing in Shakespeare is limited by the property of being Shakespeare, 
and the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is 
limited by the property of being the author of Waverley. Since identity has 
not been mentioned, it is not presented under some mode of presentation. So 
we have, broadly speaking, two terms called “qualificand” and “qualifier,” 
the relation of identity, two property-limitors or modes of presentation and 
three relational properties of being the content. Now the question is how to 
explain the relation among these elements. The Nyāya claims that they are 
related in the following way:
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The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is 
limited by the property of being Shakespeare.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of 
Waverley is limited by the property of being the author of 
Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of 
Waverley is also limited by the relation of identity.
The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is 
determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the 
author of Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of 
Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualificand 
residing in Shakespeare.
The property of being the qualification relation residing in identity 
is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the 
author of Waverley.
The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of 
Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualification 
relation residing in identity.
In this context it is to be noted that the above three types of relations 
which relate a belief to its content, viz., the property of being the 
qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the 
qualification relation, are present in any belief, true or false. But in a true 
belief there is another type of relation which relates the belief to the unified 
content or the fact by virtue of which a sentence is considered as true. Hence 
a knowledge which implies a true belief involves a relation of the belief to 
the fact that makes the belief true. For this reason, the Gettier-type objection 
does not apply to the Nyāya conception of knowledge.
Now let us discuss the nature of the belief-state. As a belief is related 
to its contents, so are the contents related to the belief. If the above three 
relations, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being 
the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation are called 
R, S and T respectively, then the relation of Shakespeare to this belief is the 
converse of R, the relation of the author of Waverley to this belief is the 
converse of S, and the relation of identity to this belief is the converse of T. 
These are all properties of John’s belief, and they are related to each other in 
the following way:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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(a) The converse of R is determined by the converse of S.
(b) The converse of S is determined by the converse of R.
(c) The converse of S is determined by the converse of T.
(d) The converse of T is determined by the converse of S.
In other words, if Shakespeare is the author of Waverley is the content 
of John’s belief, then his belief is characterised by the converse of R, the 
converse of S, and the converse of T, and they are related to each other 
in the above way. Hence by introducing the relations (a)-(d), the Nyāya 
emphasizes the unity of the belief-state. Moreover, the truth of the sentence 
“John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley” does not depend 
on the truth of the sentence “Shakespeare is the author of Waverley.” Now 
the question is, how can the belief-state of John be related to the relation 
of identity which does not exist between Shakespeare and the author of 
Waverley? If there is no such relation, then the converse of the property of 
being the qualification relation cannot characterise the belief-state of John. 
In reply, the Nyāya philosophers claim that the belief-state of John is related 
to an identity relation that is real elsewhere or elsewhen. For example, 
the belief state is related to the relation of identity that holds between 
Helen Clark and the present Prime Minister of New Zealand. Since this 
relation is real elsewhere and the belief-state is related to this relation, it is 
characterised by the converse of the qualification relation. Hence the belief-
state of John is related to a real relation. 
It is to be noted that, according to the Nyāya, a relation performs two 
functions. It can be defined in the following way: 
R is a relation Df. (  x) (  y) (It is due to R that x appears as the qualificand 
and y as the qualifier in the cognition xRy), and (  x) (  y) (It is due to R that 
there is a qualified object or fact xRy).
It is to be noted that the x and the y of the cognition need not be the same 
as the x and the y of the fact. If the cognition is true, then the x and the y of 
the cognition correspond to the x and the y of the fact. In our above example, 
the relation of identity is real elsewhere or elsewhen, to which the belief-
state is related. The cognizer is related to the relation of identity which 
holds between Helen Clark and the present Prime Minister of New Zealand. 
Hence one of the functions of a relation has been satisfied. Again, it is due 
to this relation of identity that Shakespeare appears as the qualificand and 
the author of Waverley as the qualifier in the belief-state of John. This is 
how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the postulation of non-existent 
entities in the explanation of false beliefs. Since the Nyāya philosophers 
do not postulate any intermediary entities, such as propositions,  images or 
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vivid concepts, their explanation is simpler than the explanations of some 
contemporary philosophers, such as Frege or Kaplan. Moreover, unlike early 
Russell, the verb in the subordinate clause of a belief sentence has not been 
reduced to a term.
Furthermore, in terms of these relational properties, the Nyāya 
philosophers explain the difference between (i), namely, John believes that 
Shakespeare is the author of Waverley, and 
(ii) John believes that the author of Waverley is Shakespeare.
In (ii) the author Waverley has the property of being the qualificand and 
Shakespeare has the property of being the qualifier. Hence the converse 
of the property of being the qualificand in (ii) will not be the same as the 
converse of the property of being the qualificand in (i). Similarly, the 
converse of the property of being the qualifier in (ii) will not be the same as 
the converse of the property of being the qualifier in (i). From this it follows 
that the truth of (i) does not entail the truth of (ii). Similarly, the truth of 
(ii) does not entail the truth of (i), although the truth of “Shakespeare is 
the author of Waverley” entails the truth of “The author of Waverley is 
Shakespeare” and vice versa. Hence the Nyāya analysis in terms of the 
relational properties of a belief-state explains the difference in truth-value 
between (i) and (ii), and consequently the difference in meaning between 
them.
This analysis of the Nyāya also explains why the principle of 
substitutivity fails. From (i) we cannot infer “John believes that the author 
of Hamlet is the author of Waverley”,  although the sentence “Shakespeare is 
the author of Hamlet” is true. Since the mode of presentation of Shakespeare 
is the property of being Shakespeare and the mode of presentation of the 
author of Hamlet is the property of being the author of Hamlet, we cannot 
derive “John believes that the author of Hamlet is the author of Waverley” 
from (i). But we can derive “John believes that Sir Walter is the author of 
Hamlet” from “John believes that Scott is the author of Hamlet” if “Scott” 
and “Sir Walter” refer to the same person who is presented under the same 
mode in both the cases. In other words, the principle of substitutivity holds 
good only in those cases where the terms refer to the same thing that is 
presented under the same mode of presentation.
Now let us consider the following sentences:
(iii) John believes in Shakespeare.
(iv) John believes in Pegasus.
(v) John believes that Shakespeare exists.
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(vi) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
(vii) John believes that (  x) (x is a spy)
(viii) (  x) (x = Ortcutt and John believes that Ortcutt is a spy)
(ix) John believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
(x) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a   
  spy.
(xi) Tom believes that John believes that Shakespeare is the   
  author of Waverley.
If (iii) is true, and “Shakespeare” is treated as a proper name, then 
the belief-state of John is related to Shakespeare, the property of being 
Shakespeare57 and a relation which relates the property of being x to x, 
where x is a place-holder for a proper name. If these three relations are 
called u, v and w respectively, then the converse of these relations, viz., 
u-converse, v-converse and w-converse, would characterise the mental state 
of John. If (iii) is false and “Shakespeare” is a proper name, then John thinks 
of someone else, say Scott, as Shakespeare, although his mental-state is 
related to the property of being Shakespeare and the relation of qualification. 
Hence his mental-state is not related to the fact, namely, Shakespeare 
being qualified by the property of being Shakespeare. On the contrary, if 
“Shakespeare” is not a proper name but a definite description in disguise, 
then the form of (iii) does not differ from that of (iv).
In (iv) the belief-state of John is not related to any winged horse. It is 
related to a horse (or a unique horse), wings, and the relation of a wing to 
an animal which has wings. But it is not related to the qualified object, viz., 
the winged horse. Hence the converse of the first three relations only would 
characterise the belief-state of John. As his belief-state is not related to the 
qualified object, the converse of this relation cannot qualify his belief. (iv) 
gives us the model for the treatment of empty singular terms which have 
occurred in believed-sentences or expressions.
In (v) the belief-state of John is related to Shakespeare qualified by 
the property of being Shakespeare, an object qualified by the property 
existence,58 and the relation of identity. If the believed sentence is true, 
then his belief-state is also related to Shakespeare as being identical with an 
existent object, and the converses of these four relations would characterise 
the mental state of John. This analysis also shows how the Nyāya draws 
the distinction between (iii) and (v), and thereby explains the difference in 
meaning between “Shakespeare” and “Shakespeare exists”. In this context, 
it is to be noted that the Nyāya, unlike some contemporary philosophers, has 
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not identified the meaning of `Shakespeare exists’ with that of `Shakespeare 
is Shakespeare’. Similarly, the Nyāya has drawn a distinction in meaning 
between “The author of Waverley”, “The author of Waverley exists” and 
“The author of Waverley is the author of Waverley”.
Since (vi) can be true without implying the existence of Ortcutt or 
without implying Ortcutt being a spy, the Nyāya claims that the belief-state 
of John is related to Ortcutt, but need not be related to Ortcutt qualified by 
the property existence. This is due to the fact that existence is a property in 
the Nyāya system. Therefore, the relation to the property-posessor does not 
imply the relation to its properties, such as existence. The belief state is also 
related to a spy, and a relation of identity, but not to Ortcutt being identical 
with a spy. Hence the converses of these three relations would qualify the 
belief-state of John. This analysis also shows why the rule of existential 
generalisation cannot be applied to it.
(vii) could be true even if no one is a spy, and hence the belief-state 
cannot be related to a spy. According to the Nyāya in this case, the belief-
state is related to the property spyhood, an existent object, and the relation 
of instantiation, but not to an existent object qualified by spyhood. Hence the 
belief-state is qualified by the converse of these three relational properties 
only. If spyhood is an unexemplified property, then the word “spyhood” 
cannot be treated as an atomic expression. Hence it is to be explained in 
terms of at least two non-empty terms, and the belief-state is related to the 
referents of these non-empty terms.
In (viii) the belief-state is not only related to Ortcutt, a spy and the 
relation of identity, but also related to Ortcutt qualified by existence. But 
it is not related to Ortcutt qualified by existence being identical with a spy. 
Hence the mental state is qualified by the converses of the first four relations 
only. Hence the truth of (viii) will depend on the truth of “(  x)(x = Ortcutt)” 
but not on the truth of “Ortcutt is a spy.”
In (ix) the belief-state is related to Ortcutt, the absence of spyhood which 
is present somewhere, and the relation of an absence to its possessor,59 but it 
is not related to Ortcutt qualified by the absence of spyhood. Hence the truth 
of (ix) does not depend on the truth of “Ortcutt is not a spy.”
As regards (x), the Nyāya claims that it cannot be made true under any 
condition. Since there is no contradiction anywhere, there cannot be any 
contradiction at the level of thought or belief-state.60 The sentence “Ortcutt 
is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy” is meaningful, but it does not generate 
a cognition either in a hearer or a speaker. Each of the conjuncts of this 
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conjunctive sentence would generate a separate cognition, but there is no 
one unified cognition which will correspond to this sentence. The thought of 
“Ortcutt is a spy” would prevent occurrence of the thought of “Ortcutt is not 
a spy” and vice versa. Hence these two thoughts or belief-states are related 
to each other by the preventer-prevented relation.61
(xi) describes the mental or the belief-state of Tom, and it could be true 
even if John does not believe that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley 
or no one believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. In this case 
Tom’s belief-state is related to a belief-state, not necessarily to a belief-
state of John. Furthermore, his belief-state is related to the converse of the 
relation of a belief to Shakespeare, the converse of the relation of a belief 
to the author of Waverley, and the converse of the relation of a belief to the 
relation of identity. Moreover, Tom’s belief-state is related to John and to 
the relation of inherence which relates a belief-state to its possessor in the 
ontology of the Nyāya. Let us use the following symbols for these relations:
A for the relation of Tom’s belief-state to some other belief-
state.
B for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the 
relation of a belief to Shakespeare. 
C for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the 
relation of a belief to the author of Waverley.
D for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the 
relation of a belief to an identity relation.
E for the relation of Tom’s belief-state to John.
F for the relation of his belief-state to the relation of inherence, 
which relates a belief-state to its possessor in the ontology of 
the Nyāya.
Now the converses of these relations would characterise the belief-state 
of Tom. Since these converses are related to each other by the determiner-
determined relation which holds between the correlative terms, the complex 
(E-converse, F-converse and A-converse) determines and is determined by 
the complex (B-converse, D-converse and C-converse). This analysis of 
the Nyāya shows how (xi) can be true even if John does not believe that 
Shakespeare is the author of Waverley or no one believes that Shakespeare is 
the author of Waverley.
Since the Nyāya philosophers can explain belief-sentences which contain 
negation, conjunction, quantifier, or which express higher-order beliefs, they 
can explain all types of belief-sentences in a standard language.
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Now let us consider Kripke’s puzzle about belief.62 He claims that co-
designative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts salva 
veritate. Hence one may assent to “Cicero was bald” and to “Tully was not 
bald”, although both “Cicero” and “Tully” refer to the same person. Kripke 
has put forward the following example to substantiate this point. Pierre, a 
native of France, asserts in French (a) Londres est jolie. After moving to 
London from France, he assents to (b) London is not pretty.
From this example Kripke concludes that co-referential terms cannot be 
substituted for each other without changing the truth-value.
From the Nyāya point of view we can say that co-designative terms are 
interchangeable in belief contexts if they have the same limitor. Suppose 
Cicero has a unique and an essential property, say F. According to the 
Nyāya, the meaning of the name “Cicero” includes both the person referred 
to by the word “Cicero” and the limitor F. If “Tully” also refers to the same 
person under the same mode of presentation, then both of them have the 
same meaning. Since we are concerned with belief, we can use any language 
to describe it. Hence it has nothing to do with assenting to a sentence, which 
requires mastery over a language, including knowing the meanings of the 
terms. Even if a person does not know any language, we can describe his 
belief-state in our language. If we come to know that Pierre believes that 
Londres est jolie, then we can use English or any other language to describe 
the same belief-state. Hence we can claim that Pierre believes that London 
is pretty. Therefore, any synonymous expression or sentence can be used to 
describe the same belief. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would solve 
the puzzle about belief.
From the above discussion it follows that Nyāya techniques may be 
used to suggest new solutions to some problems of contemporary Western 
philosophy. It has also been shown how these techniques can solve the 
Gettier and the post-Gettier problems of epistemology. Since justification 
is considered as a qualifier of truth and truth as a qualifier of belief, we 
have solved one of the age-old problems of knowledge. It has also been 
demonstrated how the Nyāya philosophers have used epistemic relational 
properties, such as the property of being the qualificand, the property of 
being the qualifier, the property of being the qualification relation, the 
property of being the limitor, the property of being the determiner, the 
property of being the qualified object, the property of being the subject and 
the property of being the predicate. By using these relational properties 
and their converses, we can draw not only the distinction between different 
belief-sentences but also the distinction in meaning between sentences, such 
as “Brutus killed Caesar” and “Caesar was killed by Brutus”. Hence the 
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Nyāya techniques may be used to draw the distinction in meaning between 
sentences which are transformationally equivalent.
Moreover, it has been shown how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided 
the postulation of intermediary entities, such as images or propositions, as 
well as universal scepticism in epistemology. Hence the Indian philosophers 
have not only discussed some of the problems and puzzles of contemporary 
philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Chomsky and Kripke, but also 
suggested better solutions. This is how Indian philosophy can add a new 
dimension to Western philosophy.63
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